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3OVERVIEW & BACKGROUND
This report addresses a number of key considerations that those managing open source software de-
velopment initiatives should take into account when thinking about structure, organization, and gov-
ernance. The genesis of this project involved an investigation into anecdotal reports that companies 
and other institutions developing open source software were facing difficulties obtaining tax exempt 
nonprofit status under Section 501(c)(3) of Title 26 of the United States Code. Based on conversations 
with a number of constituents in the open source software development community, the authors have 
prepared this report to address specific questions about nonprofit status alongside questions about 
corporate formation and governance models more generally. 
Nothing in this report should be viewed as a substitute for specific legal advice on the narrow ques-
tions facing particular organizations under particular sets of factual circumstances. But, the authors 
are hopeful the document provides a general overview of the complex issues that open source initia-
tives face when balancing a need for structure and continuity with the innovative and experimental 
spirit at the heart of many open source development projects.
The report has two primary parts:
• First, it addresses some formal organizational considerations that open source software initiatives 
should weigh, evaluating the benefits of taking on a formal structure and the options for doing so. 
The report provides information about different types of corporate organization that open source 
projects may wish to consider. And, it delves into Internal Revenue Service policy and practice and 
US tax law concerning questions about the tax exemptions referenced above. 
• In its second half, the authors pull back to consider more broadly questions of organizational struc-
ture, offering ideas about governance models that open source organizations may wish to explore, 
separate from formal corporate structure, as they seek to achieve their missions. 
Different considerations may inform the choice of formal, legal organizational structures (on the one 
hand) and governance models (on the other hand). By addressing both, the authors hope that this 
report will be useful to the broadest possible range of managers of and contributors to open source 
development initiatives.
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Behlendorf; Nathan Freitas; Esther Lim; Ellen Lubell; Allison Randal; Wendy Seltzer; Tom Stites; and 
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PART I
THE QUESTION OF 
INCORPORATION FOR 
OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 
INITIATIVES
Introduction
Corporate formation may not be the first item 
on the to-do list of an open source project just 
beginning to expand. But, having a formal busi-
ness structure can confer benefits that open 
source projects might find desirable as they 
plan their growth.
First, a corporate entity can shield the organi-
zation’s founders and members from personal 
liability should someone bring a suit against the 
project. The existence of a legal entity also helps 
delineate ownership of the project’s assets, 
which can help open source projects sort ques-
tions of intellectual property more clearly. In 
addition, all corporate formation options avail-
able in the United States come with stipulations 
on how entities should be run and managed. 
These requirements create structural support, 
governance and process rules, and checks and 
balances for how an entity should operate and 
make decisions. Those tools, in turn, can help 
promote the longevity of an open source project 
and protect it from organizational turmoil re-
garding decision-making authority, ownership 
of ideas, and financial questions.
Many open source initiatives have a desire to 
adopt a mission-driven business model because 
they intend for their work to give back to the 
open source development community and serve 
the public good. Following the example of some 
of the most established open source organiza-
tions, many attempt to form as a nonprofit cor-
porations with tax-exempt status. While there 
are benefits to achieving so-called 501(c)(3) 
status, several alternative models of corporate 
formation exist that open source projects would 
be wise to consider because they may align bet-
ter with a particular project’s goals. 
In this section, the authors address several vari-
eties of nonprofit designation (including tax-ex-
empt status), for-profit corporation models, and 
hybrid benefit corporations to help open source 
projects understand how to best utilize the ad-
vantages of corporate formation to suit their 
specific needs. 
501(c)3 Status, the IRS, and Open 
Source
Open source projects often seek to follow in the 
footsteps of well-known organizations such as 
Apache and Mozilla and seek nonprofit status. 
This approach may be driven by a sense that 
nonprofit status exempts an organization from 
paying federal and state income taxes. But, that 
is not necessarily the case. In fact, an organi-
zation must qualify for a tax exemption under 
federal tax law. 
The Internal Revenue Code exempts certain non-
profit organizations, including “[c]orporations, 
and any community chest, fund, or foundation, 
organized and operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, 
literary, or educational purposes,” from paying 
federal income taxes.1 Because this specific ex-
emption appears in 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3), people 
often refer to organizations that receive the ex-
emption as “501(c)(3)s” or as having “501(c)(3) 
status.”
Historically, some open source organizations 
have preferred the 501(c)(3) exemption to oth-
er 501(c) alternatives.2 Nonprofit open source 
organizations generally provide their software 
to the public for free.3 These organizations may 
rely on donations in order to pay for any or-
ganizational expenses.4 Donors prefer to make 
donations when they can take deductions for 
their donations and as a result are more likely 
to make donations to nonprofits with 501(c)(3) 
status.5 As a result, in order to make their organi-
zations attractive to potential donors, nonprofit 
open source organizations often have sought 
the 501(c)(3) exemption.
At the beginning of the open source software 
movement, open source organizations attained 
the 501(c)(3) exemption without much difficul-
ty. Open source organizations began to apply 
for 501(c)(3) status as early as 2001.6 The Mozil-
la Foundation received an Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (“IRS”) determination of its 501(c)(3) status 
within six months of submitting its application.7 
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Over the course of the 2000s, open source orga-
nizations were able to obtain 501(c)(3) status on 
a regular basis. A 2008 report by the Software 
Freedom Law Center encouraged open source 
organization founders to consider applying for 
501(c)(3) status on the basis that “[t]he IRS has 
regularly recognized organizations created for 
the promotion of free and open source software 
projects as having charitable purposes.”8 The 
accompanying Case Study #1, which examines 
the Apache Software Foundation, illustrates the 
ease with which open source software organiza-
tions were able to obtain 501(c)(3) status during 
this period.
Shift in IRS Policy
In the past few years, open source software or-
ganizations have begun to experience greater 
difficulty in obtaining 501(c)(3) status. For ex-
ample, the Open Source Elections Technology 
Foundation (OSET) (formerly the Open Source 
Digital Voting Foundation) applied for 501(c)
(3) status in 2007.9 Although OSET eventually re-
ceived 501(c)(3) status, the IRS review of OSET’s 
application lasted for over six years, and OSET’s 
application was initially denied.10 OSET’s expe-
rience is not exceptional. According to Wired, 
“numerous open source projects” reported that 
the IRS had “put a freeze on their nonprofit ap-
plications.”11
The change in treatment of open source soft-
ware companies arose directly from a shift in 
IRS policy. During the scandal surrounding IRS 
denial of 501(c)(3) status to Tea Party organi-
zations, the United States House of Represen-
tatives Ways and Means Committee released 
the IRS’s “Be on the Look Out” lists (“BOLOs”).12 
The BOLOs listed kinds of organizations that the 
IRS had identified as potentially unsuitable for 
501(c)(3) status.13 Every released BOLO dated 
between August 2010 and July 2012 included 
open source organizations.14 
The lists explain that open source software or-
ganizations should be monitored because “[t]he 
members of these organizations are usually the 
for-profit business or for-profit support techni-
cians of the software. The software is provided 
for free, however; fees are charged for techni-
cal support by the for-profit.”15 The BOLOs thus 
misrepresented the wide variety of open source 
software business models, ignoring that many 
open source software organizations do not have 
affiliations with for-profit businesses. Neverthe-
less, the BOLOs drove IRS policy for at least two 
years.
While the IRS has discontinued its use of BO-
LOs,16 the shift toward more stringent reviews 
of 501(c)(3) applications remains. OSET was 
able to obtain 501(c)(3) status, but many open 
source software organizations still are waiting 
for determinations.17
The accompanying Case Study #2, Case Study 
#3, and Case Study #4 examine open source 
software organizations’ applications for 501(c)
(3) status filed in the past five years. Together, 
these examples illustrate the trend toward more 
restrictive IRS review of such applications, un-
derscore the fact that an organization’s mission 
remains key in the context of such review by the 
Internal Revenue Service, and drive home the 
point that such mission must go beyond mere 
provision of free code by promoting a greater 
educational or social good.
Conclusion
Since the beginning of the 21st century, open 
source software organizations have pursued 
501(c)(3) status in order to operate on nonprof-
it, donations-based business models. 501(c)
(3) status exempted these organizations from 
federal income tax and made donations to the 
organizations tax-deductible for the donors. 
Originally, open source stalwarts like Apache 
obtained 501(c)(3) status with ease. However, 
the past few years have witnessed a sea change 
in IRS treatment of nonprofit open source soft-
ware organizations. Based allegedly on suspi-
cions of abuse of 501(c)(3) status by nonprofit 
open source software organizations affiliated 
with for-profit software developers, the IRS has 
raised its threshold for granting such nonprofits 
501(c)(3) status. 
In the wake of recent delays and rejections of 
501(c)(3) applications, 501(c)(3) status appears 
harder to obtain than ever for open source soft-
ware organizations. While some open source 
software organizations may continue to obtain 
501(c)(3) status, this option may be closed off – 
in particular, for organizations that choose not 
to or cannot offer activities to educate the pub-
lic in software development or a demonstrable 
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connection to a charitable purpose. Given these 
changes, open source software organizations 
can no longer count on obtaining 501(c)(3) sta-
tus and may want to evaluate the pros and cons 
of adopting alternative business structures.
BEYOND 501(C)(3): 
STRUCTURAL 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 
INITIATIVES
Introduction
As open source software organizations face 
greater difficulty in obtaining 501(c)(3) status, 
some organizations may begin to consider al-
ternative options to the traditional 501(c)(3) 
nonprofit model. A broad spectrum of options 
exists; some options would require only a small 
shift in operations, while others would force or-
ganizations to embrace new models altogether. 
This section outlines some of these entity forma-
tion options available to open source software 
initiatives and considers how those managing 
open source projects might use these options to 
achieve their goals.
Alternative Federal Tax-Exempt Status 
Recognitions: 501(c)(4) & 501(c)(6)
Certain open source software organizations 
may be able to find limited opportunities for 
federal tax-exempt status by seeking recogni-
tion under other subprovisions of Section 501. 
With 501(c)(3) status increasingly unattainable, 
open source software organizations that wish to 
obtain federal tax exempt status may need to 
consider federal tax exemption under 501(c)(4) 
and 501(c)(6).18 
Like 501(c)(3), organizations recognized under 
501(c)(4) and 501(c)(6) are exempt from feder-
al income tax.19 However, donations to organi-
zations recognized under 501(c)(4) and 501(c)
(6) are not tax deductible.20 As discussed above, 
tax deductibility incentivizes donors to donate 
to open source software organizations. Without 
this benefit, operating on a donations-based 
nonprofit business model may become more 
difficult. 
Moreover, recognition under 501(c)(4) and 
501(c)(6) is available only to certain kinds of 
organizations. 501(c)(4) status is reserved for 
“civic leagues or organizations . . . devoted ex-
clusively to charitable, educational, or recre-
ational purposes.”21 As discussed above, the IRS 
has become reluctant to find that open source 
software organizations applying for 501(c)
(3) status operate for charitable or education-
al purposes. Furthermore, IRS guidance states 
that an organization created primarily for rec-
reational purposes should apply for exemption 
under 501(c)(7) rather than 501(c)(4).22 As a re-
sult, most open source software organizations 
probably should not rely on 501(c)(4) for ob-
taining tax-exempt status. 
Some types of open source software organiza-
tions have had some success obtaining federal 
income tax exemptions under 501(c)(6). 501(c)
(6) exempts business leagues from federal in-
come tax.23 IRS guidance explains that people 
found business leagues in order to promote 
a business interest that the founders share in 
common.24 In the open source software commu-
nity, 501(c)(6) organizations generally act as 
umbrella organizations for many projects rath-
er than working directly on a single project. For 
example, the Dojo Foundation and the Eclipse 
Foundation are 501(c)(6) organizations that 
support open source software projects.25 But, a 
shift in IRS policy toward open source software 
organizations applying for 501(c)(6) status – 
which parallels the shift regarding 501(c)(3) ap-
plications – may be underway.
The OpenStack Foundation, which supports 
the OpenStack ecosystem, was recently denied 
501(c)(6) status. According to Mark McLoughlin, 
an OpenStack Foundation board member, the 
IRS argued that the foundation is engaging in 
business regularly carried on for profit and is im-
proving business conditions only for its members 
rather than for the entire industry.26 Jonathon 
Bryce, the executive director of the Foundation, 
noted that the Foundation is “fundamentally no 
different from other similar [open source soft-
ware] 501(c)(6) organizations.”27 While Bryce 
offered this statement to support the argument 
that the OpenStack Foundation eventually will 
receive 501(c)(6) status, the same point could 
favor a shift in IRS policy toward refusing to 
grant 501(c)(6) status and revoking 501(c)(6) 
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status from other open source software umbrel-
la organizations.
Given the complexities associated with achiev-
ing exemptions from federal income tax, open 
source software organizations may have to be-
gin reassessing their business models. Organi-
zations may decide to continue to operate as 
nonprofits while paying federal income taxes, 
generate and rely on profits, or adopt a middle 
path between those two extremes.
Nonprofit Corporations
Some open source software projects may de-
cide to continue to operate as nonprofit corpo-
rations even if the organizations have to pay 
federal income taxes as long as their federal 
income tax burden is not excessive. Organiza-
tions form as nonprofit corporations at the state 
level.28 This process of entity formation occurs 
before and independent from any decision re-
garding exemption from federal income taxes.29 
Depending on the laws of the state of incorpora-
tion, a nonprofit corporation may or may not be 
exempt from state sales, property, and income 
tax.30 For example, a Massachusetts nonprofit 
corporation may qualify for state tax exemp-
tions only after receiving federal income tax 
exemption.31 Once the Massachusetts nonprofit 
corporation is exempt from federal income tax-
es, it must apply separately for exemption from 
state sales, property, and income taxes.32 An 
open source software organization interested in 
continuing to operate as nonprofit corporations 
should consider the laws of the state in which 
the organization is incorporated in conjunction 
with its own financial situation. 
An organization may find, for example, that its 
operating profit is so low that paying federal 
and state taxes does not impose an undue bur-
den on the organization.33 In this situation, the 
organization may elect to operate as a nonprof-
it corporation and would not need to change 
its entity type or business model. On the other 
hand, if the organization found that the result-
ing tax burden was excessive, it may need to 
consider adopting a new business model. 
For-Profit Entities:
Corporations & Limited Liability 
Companies
For open source software organizations that 
consider adopting a for-profit business model, 
three primary entity forms are available: C cor-
porations, S corporations, and limited liability 
companies.
C Corporations
The C corporation is the default entity type for 
most businesses that seek outside investors, 
particularly in the venture capital arena.34 Cor-
porations offer a few benefits that have helped 
them retain relevance as new entity forms have 
developed. First, corporations limit sharehold-
ers’ liability for corporate debts.35 Shareholders’ 
liability may not exceed the capital they have 
invested in the corporation.36 Additionally, out-
side investors often prefer to invest in corpora-
tions because state corporate law is extensive 
and corporate case law is well settled.37 Busi-
nesses and shareholders can thus better predict 
the potential legal consequences of a business 
decision and act with greater certainty. C cor-
porations also have some flexibility in structur-
ing their ownership. This flexibility can allow C 
corporations to restrict voting rights to certain 
classes of shareholders or offer preferred shares 
that afford investors precedence in receiving 
dividends over common stock holders.38 A C cor-
poration may have unlimited shareholders and 
multiple classes of shareholders with different 
rights.39
C corporation tax status offers both advantag-
es and disadvantages. In addition to offering 
limited liability, arguably the most well-known 
trait of C corporations is double taxation. Cor-
porate earnings are taxed twice—once at the 
corporate level and once at the shareholder lev-
el, when the corporation makes distributions to 
its shareholders.40 Additionally, corporate losses 
do not pass through to shareholders, so share-
holders cannot use corporate losses to offset 
their own capital gains.41 
On the other hand, the double taxation struc-
ture may benefit some C corporations when 
compared to the pass-through structure of S 
corporations (discussed in the next section). 
Unlike an S corporation – in which corporate in-
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come passes through the corporate structure di-
rectly to shareholders – a C corporation retains 
all earnings not distributed as dividends.42 As a 
result, shareholders in C corporations do not 
pressure the corporation to distribute earnings 
immediately, as shareholders in S corporations 
might.43 C corporations, therefore, can retain 
and reinvest their earnings more easily than S 
corporations.44 
Furthermore, while S Corporations have to elect 
S Corporation status and meet IRS eligibility 
requirements, C corporations retain a default 
IRS status.45 C corporations do not have to exert 
any extra effort to obtain their tax status and 
do not run the risk of losing it.46 This default po-
sition provides greater tax certainty for the cor-
poration and its shareholders.
C corporations’ corporate and tax traits make 
them a good choice for open source software 
projects that wish to operate on a for-profit busi-
ness model and solicit investments from outside 
investors. The relative predictability of C corpo-
rations makes them ideal for attracting angel in-
vestors and venture capital. On the other hand, 
C corporations probably would not appeal to 
projects that wish to limit ownership to specif-
ic investors who hope to gain pass-through tax 
benefits or structure the organization beyond 
the confines of settled corporate law.
S Corporations
An organization can become an S corporation 
by incorporating at the state level and then 
electing to be taxed as an S corporation at the 
federal level.47 Because S corporations are sim-
ply corporations at the state level, they share 
many characteristics with C corporations. For 
instance, S corporations also offer limited liabil-
ity to shareholders and are subject to the same 
laws and case law at the state level.48 Unlike C 
corporations, however, S corporations may only 
offer a single class of stock and may not have 
more than 100 shareholders.49 Partnerships, cor-
porations, and non-resident aliens may not hold 
shares of S corporations,50 limiting the pool of 
potential investors for an S corporation. On the 
other hand, S corporations’ gains and losses 
pass through directly to shareholders, allowing 
S corporations to avoid double taxation.51 Cer-
tain investors may prefer these pass-through 
benefits to the certainty attached to C corpo-
ration status, as discussed above. S corporation 
status may be ideal for projects that want to 
limit ownership to a small group of U.S. resident 
individuals who prefer S corporations’ pass-
through characteristics.
Limited Liability Companies
Limited liability companies (“LLCs”) offer the 
owners flexibility to create their own rules for 
the LLC via contract while limiting their liability. 
Similar to shareholders of corporations, share-
holders in LLCs (generally called “members”) 
“are not personally liable for the entity’s debts 
and obligations.”52 
LLCs’ governance and operations are largely de-
termined by an LLC operating agreement signed 
by the LLC’s members.53 For example, the oper-
ating agreement may delegate management 
responsibilities to a certain member or mem-
bers, or it may spread management responsi-
bilities among all members.54 Because members 
can customize their LLC through contract, and 
because the LLC form is a more recent creation, 
LLCs do not benefit from the same legal certainty 
as corporations.55 The legal consequences of an 
LLC’s actions are more difficult to predict than 
those of a corporation, and in certain instances 
this uncertainty could have a chilling effect on 
the LLC’s willingness to take risks. Like S corpo-
rations, LLCs offer pass-through tax benefits to 
their members, although an LLC also may elect 
to be taxed as a C corporation.56 
Organizations with owners who wish to con-
struct their relationship through contract, do 
not mind the greater legal uncertainty attached 
to LLCs, and want pass-through tax benefits 
may consider forming as an LLC. Organizations 
that wish to seek funding from outside investors 
who are more comfortable with the familiarity 
of corporations, however, may be better served 
by another type of entity.
A Third Way: Benefit Corporations
Benefit corporations offer many of the same 
benefits as C corporations while also elevating 
organizations’ purpose-driven missions. Benefit 
corporations were created to address a gap in 
the framework of legal entities. Traditionally, 
U.S. federal and state law created a binary sys-
tem of entity formation: entities focused on ei-
ther generating profit or promoting a non-profit, 
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purpose-driven mission.57 Directors of corpora-
tions owe duties to their corporations to act in 
the corporations’ best interests.58 For for-profit 
corporations, case law generally focuses on 
whether the director acted in the corporation’s 
financial best interests.59 No clear authority em-
powers for-profit corporation directors to con-
sider other interests; for instance, while a direc-
tor may be aware of the effects of a business 
decision on workers, customers, or other stake-
holders, neither statutes and case law state that 
a for-profit corporation director can consider 
these interests on the same level as, or instead 
of, the corporation’s financial interests.60
Unlike traditional corporations, benefit corpora-
tions can balance financial and non-financial 
interests in making business decisions. Under 
model legislation passed in several states, bene-
fit corporations have a “general public benefit” 
purpose and also may identify “specific public 
benefit” purposes.61 Considered to be “in the 
best interests of the benefit corporation,” these 
mission-based purposes are on equal foot-
ing with the corporation’s for-profit purpose.62 
In making a business decision, directors may 
weigh the corporation’s mission-based purpos-
es as well as the decision’s potential effects on 
stakeholders, the greater community in which 
the benefit corporation operates, and the envi-
ronment.63
Mission-driven open source software initiatives 
may want to consider incorporating as benefit 
corporations so that they can place their mis-
sion-based purpose front and center in deci-
sion-making. Benefit corporations offer oppor-
tunities and disadvantages for raising capital 
when compared to traditional for-profit C cor-
porations. Because benefit corporations are 
structured and operate similarly to C corpora-
tions, many investors may be attracted to bene-
fit corporations by the familiarity of their struc-
ture.64 Investor interest may increase due to 
benefit corporations’ mission-driven character-
istics, particularly if investors share the corpo-
ration’s values or goals. On the other hand, ben-
efit corporations may have difficulty attracting 
funding from risk-averse investors who are wary 
of the challenge of balancing financial and 
non-financial interests and of the lack of case 
law relating to benefit corporations’ business 
decisions. Benefit corporations also share C 
corporations’ disadvantages, including double 
taxation. Certain investors may prefer another 
corporate structure. However, if an organization 
wishes to maintain the C corporation’s broad 
appeal to investors while also making business 
decisions in line with the organization’s social 
mission, the organization may wish to consider 
incorporating as a benefit corporation.
Conclusion
Open source software organizations seeking to 
move beyond 501(c)(3) nonprofit status may 
choose from a plethora of corporate forms and 
tax designations. 501(c)(4) and 501(c)(6) desig-
nation may offer a small number of open source 
software projects and umbrella organizations 
continuing access to exemption from federal in-
come tax. Otherwise, organizations may decide 
to continue to operate as nonprofits without re-
ceiving tax-exempt status. 
Other organizations may adopt a for-profit 
business model and choose from among C cor-
porations, S corporations, and LLCs, depending 
on each organization’s goals, need for outside 
funding, and management preferences. 
Finally, organizations that wish to generate 
profits while also furthering a social mission 
may consider incorporating as a benefit corpo-
ration. As the open source software community 
begins to move beyond 501(c)(3), organizations 
may move beyond a one-size-fits-all model and 
increasingly explore and experiment with new 
corporate structures that best fit their needs 
and goals.
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PART II
GOVERNANCE MODELS 
FROM THE OPEN SOURCE 
WORLD & BEYOND
Introduction
Because of the importance of community par-
ticipation and contribution in the open source 
world, some projects believe that formalized 
structures may hinder their growth. They worry 
developers will perceive formal governance as 
“red tape” and be less willing to contribute.65 
Certain open source founders also fear that af-
ter implementing a governance structure, they 
will lose control over the direction of the proj-
ect.66 
These concerns can be dispelled by carefully 
selecting an appropriate governance model. A 
properly executed governance structure should 
encourage developers to contribute, not hin-
der contributions. Further, founders can retain 
as much control over projects as they want by 
choosing a governance structure in line with 
their goals and needs.67
This section of the report examines several ex-
amples of governance models, including be-
nevolent dictatorship, meritocracy (sometimes 
known as enlightened dictatorship), delegated 
governance, dynamic governance, and a feder-
ated model. It explores the skills and traits proj-
ect leaders may wish to develop or identify in 
others to best further the goals of the project. 
In highlighting known and more novel gover-
nance models, the authors hope to help fledg-
ing groups make informed choices so that they 
may develop the community and practices they 
envision.68 
Levels of Control and Openness
Before an open source project chooses a spe-
cific governance model, it may be useful to ask 
two questions: (1) how open to new contributors 
should the project be; and (2) how much should 
project processes be predetermined? The ways 
in which a given open source initiative answers 
these two questions can have significant im-
pacts on the project.
Openness: The Cathedral & Bazaar
A chief tenet of open source software develop-
ment is that anyone can contribute to a project. 
But projects define “anyone” in different ways. 
In the early days of large-scale open-source col-
laboration online, Eric Raymond characterized 
the two ends of the spectrum of open software 
development as the “cathedral” and the “ba-
zaar.”69 Even today, open source organizations 
generally fall nearer to one end of this spectrum 
or the other.70 
In a cathedral model, a small team of dedicat-
ed contributors builds and maintains the open 
source project.71 Usually, some connection to 
the project or demonstration of skill is neces-
sary to participate, and product releases are 
closely controlled by the project leadership.72 As 
a result, cathedral projects involve fewer people 
overall, and their releases happen less frequent-
ly.73 In the earliest days of open source software 
development, before the Internet was used wide-
ly outside of universities, the cathedral model 
was the primary means by which open source 
software developed.74
On the opposite end of the spectrum is the ba-
zaar model. The term was coined to describe the 
processes at Linux, one of the first open source 
projects to eschew the cathedral approach.75 
True bazaars are open to all contributors and 
harness the power of many part-time develop-
ers who work collectively via the Internet alone. 
Rather than closely monitoring every step in 
the development process, a bazaar gives great 
autonomy to its large base of contributors and 
generally puts out frequent releases, even if they 
are not perfectly honed, to correct bugs and in-
crease the sense of accomplishment among the 
dispersed developers.76
Today, many open source projects fall some-
where between the bazaar and the cathedral 
and sometimes shift as priorities and capaci-
ties change.77 Evaluating this spectrum can help 
new project leaders envision the kind of collab-
orative ethos they would like to create for their 
open-source community. 
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Control in Open-Source Organizations
Similarly, open-source projects run along a 
spectrum vis a vis how much formal control ex-
ists in the organization’s governance structure. 
Di Tullio and Staples, two management infor-
mation systems researchers, ran analyses of a 
sample of open source software organizations 
with established governance structures to bet-
ter understand the existing models in the com-
munity.78 The researchers established several 
categories of “governance dimensions” within 
these projects: ownership of assets, establish-
ment of project goals, community management, 
software development processes, conflict reso-
lution, use of information, and use of tools.79
The organizations in their samples were then 
grouped into three clusters based on their scores 
in these categories, as shown in Figure 1: open 
community, authoritarian community, and de-
fined community. The three organizational clus-
ters varied in how much they defined process 
in development and community management.80 
As the name indicates, “defined communities” 
had managed processes for every function of 
their organization, and the community as a 
whole managed the project.81 It was these com-
munities that Di Tullio and Staples found “had 
the most positive [community] climate and the 
most effective coordination,” while the author-
itarian community had the poorest results in 
both metrics, and the open community model 
fell somewhere in between.82 The researchers 
suspected the defined community model was 
most successful in these areas because it had 
clearly defined community roles, instructions, 
and project.83 The defined community model 
created “a balance between freedom [for com-
munity input] and control” over project process-
es.84 As a result, contributors felt involved in the 
project while also understanding how they were 
expected to contribute. Di Tullio and Staples’ 
research underscores the importance of clarity 
in process and roles when designing an open-
source project’s governance structure. 
With that general framework, the following sec-
tions examine several governance models to 
help open source projects create their own ver-
sions of defined communities.85
Model A: Benevolent Dictatorship
Introduction
In a benevolent dictatorship, one or a few proj-
ect founders are the final arbiters and ultimate 
decision-makers for all aspects of an open 
source project.86 An open source organization 
may decide to adopt a benevolent dictatorship 
structure when the project’s founder wants to 
keep control of the project over its lifespan.87 The 
founder may want decisions to happen through 
him or her – with decisions made either by the 
founder or with the founder’s direction. The 
founder may also may desire to be in charge of 
a body of people who make decisions about the 
project. Given this powerful position, a found-
er operating as benevolent dictator must have 
deep knowledge about all aspects of the project 
and skill and expertise in building community 
and trust. 
Despite this concentrated authority, a benevo-
lent dictatorship is not a one-man show. Just like 
all open source software, projects governed by 
benevolent dictatorships rely on contributors to 
make low-level decisions and encourage partici-
pation in discussion on project direction.88
However, final decisions are made by the benev-
olent dictator and not by the community as a 
Table 3. Open Source Project Governance Configurations:
Results from Cluster Analysis
Governance 
dimensions
Cluster 1
Open 
community
(n = 98)
Cluster 2
Authoritarian 
community
(n = 58)
Cluster 3
Defined 
community
(n = 28)
Ownership of 
assets
Highly 
restrictive
Highly 
restrictive
Highly 
restrictive
Chartering the 
project
Community 
goals
Project goals Community 
goals
Community 
management
Decentralized 
management
Centralized 
management
Decentralized 
management
Software 
development 
processes
Undefined 
process
Somewhat 
defined 
process
Managed 
process
Conflict 
resolution
Unmanaged 
conflict
Unmanaged 
conflict
Managed 
conflict
Use of 
information
Clear and 
enforced
Unclear and 
not enforced
Clear and 
enforced
Use of tools Clear and 
enforced
Unclear and 
not enforced
Clear and 
enforced
Figure 1: 65, from Dany Di Tullio & D. Sandy Staples (2013) The Gover-
nance and Management of Open Source Software Projects, Journal of 
Management Information Systems, 30:3, 49-80, http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/
MIS0742-1222300303
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whole.  The strategy and direction of a project, 
while influenced by contributors, is subject to 
a final decision by the benevolent dictator (or 
those the benevolent dictator appoints).89
Roles
There are multiple roles in a benevolent dicta-
torship. Most importantly, the benevolent dicta-
tor leads the technical direction of the project 
and organizes the community.90 Usually, a be-
nevolent dictator is self-appointed because of 
the way open-source organizations begin and 
expand. If more than one or two people found 
a project, one of the original developers will 
sometimes declare him or herself a benevolent 
dictator in order to establish a clear chain of 
command. 
Secondly, there are committers. Committers 
not only contribute code to the project but also 
screen the contributions of others – an extreme-
ly important task.91 In most cases, the benevo-
lent dictator “taps” a respected member of the 
open source community to become a commit-
ter.92 Committers often have only informal con-
trol over a certain area of the project and hold 
no more sway in the decision making process; 
however, due to his or her respected position, 
the benevolent dictator is more likely to listen to 
a committer’s suggestions.93 Usually, committers 
have direct access to the code repository.94 
A third role is that of contributor. Contributors 
are active members of the community who 
make contributions to the project but usually 
do not have direct access to the code.95 There is 
no formal process to becoming a contributor; a 
community member must merely contribute in a 
beneficial way to the project. 
Conflict Resolution
Little exists in the way of a formal conflict reso-
lution process in most benevolent dictatorships. 
Because the dictator has the final say on all 
decisions, disagreements can be handled infor-
mally within project teams.96 That being said, 
the dictator may not always intervene when 
conflict arises, choosing to remain on the side-
lines as the community sorts out the problem, or 
until it asks for the dictator’s opinion.97
Key Elements of the Benevolent Dictatorship Model for Any Open Source 
Initiative
Authority is centralized at the top
The benevolent dictator ultimately gets to call the shots in the project and retains control of the direction and scope. 
He or she sets the general course, and the community follows this lead (though most benevolent dictatorships give 
contributors room for creativity). The chain of command is clear to all involved. 
The community perception of the dictator can impact the success of the project
No one wants to work with a difficult leader, especially if the work is voluntary. While the benevolent dictator often 
garners a lot of inherent respect for his or her technical skills and vision, instances of poor leadership or disrespect-
ful behavior can alienate community members enough to abandon ship. Successful benevolent dictators must be 
judicious about using their trump card and anticipate backlash from those who invest time and effort into a patch 
only to see it rejected. 
Individual assignments are ad hoc and functionality decisions are usually depen-
dent on the benevolent dictator
Whereas some of the governance models addressed below are more strategic about placing contributors, the be-
nevolent dictator model does not require any formal assignment of tasks. The benevolent dictator may assign cer-
tain committers to specific tasks, but all contributors are generally free to work on whatever they would like. Be-
nevolent dictatorships are very often good examples of the open bazaar at work in open source governance. Many 
contributors will appreciate this freedom. But, the potential for friction between the contributor community and the 
leadership increases if contributors devote time to an aspect of the project that is eventually rejected or dismissed 
as non-essential. A benevolent dictator therefore needs to make her vision and priorities very clear to the community 
at large so that work can progress smoothly.
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Governance In Practice: Linux as 
Benevolent Dictatorship
In 1991, Linus Torvalds made available a Unix-like 
kernel on the Internet for free.98 He invited de-
velopers from anywhere to contribute code, and 
within two months, Linux 1.0 was created.99 Since 
then, thousands of developers have contributed 
to the software and Linux has become one of the 
most powerful operating systems in the world.100
Linux has no formal hierarchy that determines 
which members should contribute to each proj-
ect or task.101 Any person can contribute to is-
sues about which he is passionate, although 
another developer will improve her work if it is in-
adequate.102 Linus Torvalds’s authority is restrict-
ed to having the final word on what to do with 
patches provided by community members.103 
Despite the fact that Torvalds makes overall fi-
nal decisions, he does not wield totalitarian 
power.104 Most communication about techni-
cal decisions occurs through the Linux mailing 
list and Torvalds has to justify all his decisions 
based on technical arguments.105 Accountability 
is essential, and only by earning the communi-
ty’s respect can Torvalds’s leadership be main-
tained.106 Further, Torvalds does not personally 
manage the whole kernel; instead, he has des-
ignated a few members, whom he calls “trust-
ed lieutenants,” to lead certain subsections of 
the code.107 If Torvalds disagrees with a decision 
made by one of his lieutenants, however, he may 
overrule the lieutenant.108
Torvalds’s leadership style is not always popu-
lar in the Linux community.109 Because Torvalds 
can reject a patch in which many developers 
invested a large amount of time and effort, his 
decisions sometimes cause tension.110  One user 
wrote a long email about Torvalds’s faults, be-
ginning with the following statement: 
Linus doesn’t scale, and his current way 
of coping is to silently drop the vast 
majority of patches submitted to him 
onto the floor. Most of the time there 
is no judgement [sic] involved when 
this code gets dropped. Patches that 
fix compile errors get dropped. Code 
from subsystem maintainers that Linus 
himself designated gets dropped. A 
build of the tree now spits out numer-
ous easily fixable warnings, when at 
one time it was warning-free. Finished 
code regularly goes unintegrated for 
months at a time, being repeatedly 
resynced and re-diffed against new 
trees until the code’s maintainer gets 
sick of it. This is extremely frustrating 
to developers, users, and vendors, and 
is burning out the maintainers. It is a 
huge source of unnecessary work. The 
situation needs to be resolved. Fast.111
Despite the fact that Torvalds is not always a 
favorite in the community, most contributors re-
spect his technical expertise enough to contin-
ue developing for the project. Linux thus remains 
quite popular and successful.
Model B: Meritocracy
Introduction
A meritocracy (also called an enlightened dic-
tatorship) governance structure is loosely or-
ganized and rewards participants who make 
valuable additions to the project.112 All members 
generally are on equal footing. But, an individ-
ual’s standing can be enhanced by “merit,” or 
by contributing meaningfully over a period of 
time.113 Most decisions about the project are 
made by the community as a whole, which de-
velops its own collective ethos on what contribu-
tions and behaviors are acceptable and usually 
are more bazaar-like in operation.114 Meritocra-
cies are appropriate for open source projects 
whose founders believe that the community as a 
whole is best equipped to make decisions about 
the direction of a project. In these cases, a for-
mal decision-making and contribution structure 
is essential. 
Roles
In meritocracies, there are contributors, com-
mitters, and a small project management body 
(usually a committee).115 Contributors are devel-
opers who contribute to a project in any mean-
ingful way. Usually, this means contributions of 
code, but can also include updating documen-
tation and supporting new users.116
Committers are community members who have 
shown their dedication to the project through 
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ongoing engagement with the community. As 
a result, they can make direct changes to the 
code and do not have to contribute improve-
ments through patches.117 Committers also look 
at contributors’ code and judge what should 
and should not be included. Committers them-
selves do not technically have more authority 
than contributors but undergo a different review 
processes. The work of committers is judged by 
the community as a whole, when the community 
decides what should be allowed in the official 
release.118 
The largest difference between committers and 
contributors is apparent when the code is re-
viewed. When a contributor submits code, it is 
through a patch or pull request, which waits for 
committer approval before entering the code 
base.119 When a committer submits code, the 
committer modifies the code base directly and 
notifies relevant developers of the change. This 
gives those developers a chance to review code 
and suggest modifications, known as a “com-
mit-then-review” process.120 
A meritocracy is generally run by a project 
management committee. Members of this com-
mittee are in charge of making sure projects 
run smoothly and efficiently. They review code 
contributions, participate in strategic planning, 
approve changes to the governance model and 
manage legal issues (such as code licensing pol-
icies) within the project.121 New members of the 
committee are invited to join by existing mem-
bers, and the original make-up is chosen by the 
project creators.122 Though committee members 
have no significant authority over other commu-
nity members, the project management commit-
tee does select committers. The committee also 
makes decisions when the community cannot 
reach an agreement.123 
Conflict Resolution
In meritocracies, decision making usually in-
volves a proposal, a discussion, a vote (if no 
agreement is reached during the discussion), 
and – finally – a decision. Any community 
member can propose a change by submitting 
a patch or proposal through project commu-
nication channels.124 The proposed change is 
reviewed and discussed by the community.  In 
general, if no one explicitly opposes a proposed 
change, it is assumed to be approved –a pro-
cess called “lazy consensus.”125 The “lazy con-
sensus” reduces time wasted by forcing people 
to explicitly agree with new contributions, and 
instead only requires feedback from opponents. 
If there is opposition to a proposed change, the 
change is discussed and voted upon, and a de-
cision is made.126 
Key Elements of the Meritocracy Model for Any Open Source Initiative
Authority is decentralized
Though the original project founders may serve on the project management committee, which leads discussion or 
resolves conflict on big-picture community issues, the general direction of the project is ultimately set by the com-
munity at large. 
Committers play a unique role in shaping the project
Because committers get to approve contributors’ patches and their own contributions are reviewed after the fact, 
they may end up having a larger say in how the project progresses. Sometimes, this power means that meritocratic 
organizations end up overlooking useful contributions because of committer biases. For example, researchers exam-
ining GitHub pull requests found that women’s pull requests were incorporated into projects nearly ten percentage 
points less often than men’s, even though women who used non-gendered screennames had the best commit rates 
for contributions.127 Good committers, therefore, need to be the most cognizant of community values and able to 
catch internal bias.
Community norms are essential
Because a meritocratic project will follow the community’s desires, initial project members must work diligently to 
create consensus on what is acceptable in the community, as well as what contributions or traits are valued. Defin-
ing “merit” is particularly imperative since both patch commits and becoming a committer depend on demonstra-
tions of bona fide “merit.” Successful meritocracies often include non-technical skills when considering a contribu-
tor’s “merit.” As evidenced in the case study below, Apache has worked to clearly define merit for their community, 
explicitly including non-coding contributions in its parameters.
15GOVERNANCE MODELS FROM THE OPEN SOURCE WORLD & BEYOND
Governance in Practice: Apache as 
Meritocracy
Apache is an open source organization run 
through a meritocracy.128  In 1999, a group of 
people that called themselves the “Apache 
Group” and had organized themselves togeth-
er several years earlier, came together again to 
continue to support and maintain the HyperText 
Transfer Protocol Daemon (or “HTTPD”) web 
server written by the National Center for Super-
computing Applications.129 The original creators 
of the HTTPD web server had abandoned the 
project, leaving the users with no support.130 
These users came together and started de-
veloping patches and information on how to 
fix problems.131 One user even created a mail-
ing list to encourage collaboration within the 
group.132  As the Internet grew larger, the group 
expanded, and Apache also grew.133 With its 
growth, Apache needed a formalized struc-
ture for contributions and decision making.7 
Apache chose a meritocracy largely because of 
its origin as a large group with a common in-
terest in supporting HTTPD. There was no one 
original “founder” who might want to establish 
a benevolent dictatorship, or other similar tech-
nical structure.  As the group grew larger, more 
and more developers contributed to the project, 
and more people started using it and wanting to 
contribute. 
At first, users would only contribute small chang-
es, such as by making minor patches or reply-
ing to emails on the user list. When the group 
decided a user had established enough “merit” 
to be trusted with more responsibility, it grant-
ed the user direct access to the code repository. 
As the group grew even bigger, it formalized its 
governance into what it is today. If a contrib-
utor consistently participates in a meaningful 
way, he or she can become a committer. Cer-
tain committers later become “members,” the 
Apache designation for participants in the main 
project management committee, which gives 
them a role in the foundation and a voice in cer-
tain organization-wide votes.134
Apache has scaled to become a large and suc-
cessful organization because newcomers are 
considered volunteers who want to help (rather 
than competing for the limited power and re-
sources in the organization). At the same time, 
Apache – like other meritocratic organizations 
– sometimes struggles with questions about 
process and conflict resolution because of the 
inherent power of committers and its minimal 
conflict resolution strategies.135 Apache makes 
efforts to combat this by publicly stating that 
they “value the community more than the code,” 
and providing community building resources, 
such as a mentorship program for new contrib-
utors.136 Apache also explicitly states that one 
can become a committer through dedication to 
community building and product management, 
not only code contributions.137
Model C: Delegated Governance
Introduction
When an open-source project’s founders want 
to allow the community to take ownership and 
leadership in the project while establishing a 
more regulated set of processes for its progres-
sion, they may turn to a delegated governance 
structure. In a delegated governance, a body of 
leaders, sometimes known as the “Community 
Council,” is chosen or elected to oversee the 
project, resolve conflicts within the community, 
modify the community norms and processes, 
and determine the project’s core values.138 De-
pending on the size of the project, a delegated 
governance system may have several sub-coun-
cils that manage specific aspects of the proj-
ect or community and report back to the main 
Community Council. Like a meritocracy, the 
delegated governance model involves more 
contributors in governance than a benevolent 
dictatorship. But, it also has a clear hierarchical 
structure and a designated set of leaders.
Roles
Like meritocracies and benevolent dictatorships, 
delegated governance involves regular commu-
nity contributors and committers who help man-
age the approval process for patches. The key 
difference between meritocracy and delegated 
governance is the addition of councils, which 
do have authority over the direction of work and 
the management of the community. Council 
members may be chosen initially by the found-
er of the project but afterward elected through 
a community-wide vote.139 
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The size and responsibilities of the council will 
depend on the organization. Councils are gen-
erally responsible for overseeing the issues they 
are tasked to cover, and discussing them and 
voting when questions arise. Normally, these 
positions are held for terms of a few years, and 
some organizations enforce term limits to ensure 
community members have ample opportunity 
to circulate into leadership roles.140 If an organi-
zation is large enough, different subcouncils will 
have authority over areas of the project, from 
technical direction to community culture to dis-
tribution, each run by council members who 
ideally have relevant expertise.141 While contrib-
utors and committers may navigate small-scale 
decisions about features or content on their 
own, larger discussion about the project’s over-
all direction take place in councils.
Conflict Resolution
In the delegated governance model, minor dis-
agreements are managed through a “lazy con-
sensus” model, similar to a meritocracy. When 
this process fails to resolve the issue, the group 
in question may choose to escalate the issue by 
bringing it to the relevant council for discussion 
and a vote.142 In an organization with different 
tiers of councils, a sub-council may vote to es-
calate the issue up the decision-making lad-
der based on its applicability to the project at 
large or the sub-council’s inability to reach an 
agreement. Whereas a pure meritocracy makes 
these decisions directly or through group delib-
eration, a delegated governance model uses a 
representatives to resolve issues.
Within the organization’s councils, and partic-
ularly the top tier, conflicts may be resolved 
in different ways depending on the size and 
make-up of the group. If the council has an even 
number of members, certain members may re-
ceive tie-breaking power.143 If the project found-
er holds a place on the Community Council, he 
or she may have that role. Additionally, some 
more commercially-focused projects reserve a 
council seat or seats for employees of for-profit 
companies that contribute significantly to the 
open-source project’s development, which may 
impact the democratic nature of project gover-
nance.144
Key Elements of the Delegated Governance Model for Any Open Source 
Initiative
Authority is centralized at the top, but also distributed through a chain of command
The delegated governance model has a central seat of power in the Community Council, but its subcouncils get to 
exercise authority over particular project areas, escalating questions up the chain of command when necessary.
Many community members can hold some form of leadership role
Open source organizations that use delegated governance have more opportunities than a benevolent dictatorship 
or a meritocracy to recognize community members by giving them leadership positions. This vote of confidence 
can keep a contributor more invested in the project and allow for greater specialization within the project. On the 
other hand, more leaders means more deliberation, and conflicts may take longer to resolve than in other forms of 
governance.
Control over project direction will vary depending on how councils are selected
If a project’s founders sit on or appoint the Community Council, it is likely they will retain a certain level of control 
over the project. If the councils are elected by community members, community representatives will have the ability 
to exert influence over the project’s evolution. In some scenarios, this will mean a nimbler organization that adapts 
quickly to change, but in others, complete changeover could cause organizational whiplash as priorities change 
rapidly from one election to the next.
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Governance In Practice: Is Ubuntu an 
Example of Delegated Governance?
Though delegated governance was first con-
ceived and described by Jono Bacon, an open 
source thought leader and community manager 
of Ubuntu, there are several ways in which Ubun-
tu does not embody the definition of delegated 
governance as Bacon describes it.145 Founded 
by software entrepreneur Mark Shuttleworth 
in 2004, Ubuntu was established early on with 
the goal of creating an open source Linux distri-
bution that was commercially useful while also 
allowing for open and transparent governance 
by the open source developing community.146 
The solution Shuttleworth created is to establish 
governing councils whose membership is open 
to all of the Ubuntu contributing community. 
Ubuntu has a Community Council that handles 
all aspects of how the Ubuntu community func-
tions, and a Technical Board that is responsible 
for all technical policy and process decisions.147 
The figure below highlights the organization’s 
structure:
The Ubuntu council system establishes a clear 
path for managing the software’s development 
and maintenance and escalating issues should 
they arise. What this diagram also reveals, how-
ever, is Shuttleworth’s role lodged within the del-
egated governance model. Shuttleworth sits on 
the Community Council and Technical Board 
and has tie-breaking power in each, though he 
cannot override the decisions of either of his own 
volition. Additionally, Shuttleworth’s for-profit 
company, Canonical, which relies heavily on 
Ubuntu’s product for its own work, has employ-
ees who work in the Ubuntu community as part 
of their role.148 Finally, Shuttleworth nominates 
Community Council and Technical Board posi-
tions (though any community member can indi-
cate their desire to be nominated), which then 
go to a vote in the relevant community.149
Shuttleworth made these choices intentionally 
when designing Ubuntu to ensure that the proj-
ect harnesses the power of its community while 
keeping in line with the needs of Canonical, and 
to that end the structure has been effective for 
Ubuntu’s continued development and growth. 
Given the amount of influence Shuttleworth 
and Canonical wield over the project, some 
may feel this makes the governance structure 
fall less squarely in the delegated governance 
model. Open-source projects could adapt this 
model to be more democratic by eliminating the 
tie-breaking power of a particular board mem-
ber and creating a more open process for filling 
out council seats, such as an election.
Model D: Dynamic Governance 
Introduction
The dynamic governance model, also known as 
sociocracy, is one designed to distribute author-
ity to every sector of an organization.150 Both 
businesses and nonprofits have used this model 
to empower employees and remove top-down 
authority. Because the open source communi-
ty overall feels strongly about the importance 
of community input and involvement, this very 
distributed model may appeal to certain open 
source initiatives.
Roles
According to experts from the Sociocratic Cen-
ter of the Netherlands, the defining characteris-
tic of dynamic governance is the “double-linked 
circle.” A dynamically governed organization 
is divided into different circles of participants, 
each with specific responsibilities.151 In most dy-
namic governance models, all members of an 
organization sit on one of its circles, which deal 
with a specific area of the organization, much 
like subcouncils in a meritocracy.152 Circles are 
organized hierarchically, culminating with the 
“general circle” (where executive leaders sit), 
but each circle membership also includes two 
representatives from the circle below (if there is 
one) and the circle above.153 
This “double link” connects the leader of the cir-
cle (a team manager, for example) to the group 
higher up, as well as an elected member who 
does not hold a specific leadership position.154 
Within any particular circle, members deliber-
Community Council
Mark Shuttleworth
Technical Board
IRC Council Forums Council
LoCo
Council
MOTU 
Council
Figure 2: From Jono Bacon’s “The Art of Community,” chapter 8 “Gover-
nance - Ubuntu Governance Example”, O’REILLY MEDIA (2009).
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ate and reach consensus on any decisions re-
garding working process and policies.155 While 
the circle’s participants handle long-term di-
rection or strategy questions through regular 
meetings and discussions, the manager or team 
leader organizes day-to-day activities, assign-
ing particular circle members to tasks in accor-
dance with the circle and organization’s larger 
goals.156 The deliberative process within a par-
ticipant circle ideally follows this model: group 
discussion on a topic to identify a solution and 
people to implement it; enactment of the solu-
tion and monitoring the results; and measuring 
the impact and soliciting group feedback to de-
termine next steps.157
Dynamic governance is well suited for an open 
source organization committed to keeping the 
average contributor as engaged in the workings 
of the project as possible because it tradition-
ally necessitates a certain level of commitment 
from all levels, including volunteers. In the same 
way, every contributor in an open-source proj-
ect would ideally be part of a circle, involving 
that contributor in the leadership structure. 
Given that open source contributors may come 
from all over the world and may not be able 
to meet live consistently for a circle, project 
founders could modify this aspect of the mod-
el to find the level of project involvement best 
for their community. Projects can organize cir-
cles around specific technical deliverables or 
community management needs that are dou-
ble-linked to the general circle, where project 
founders may sit. Some dynamic governance 
models include external experts or stakeholders 
in the general circle, which some open-source 
projects might find is a useful way to bring a 
diversity of skills into the organization.158
Conflict Resolution
Consensus is the means of resolving all disagree-
ments in the dynamic governance model. When 
a circle member identifies a problem or ques-
tion, the group convenes to discuss it, allowing 
all circle members an opportunity to voice their 
opinions and ask questions.159 In the world of dy-
namic governance, a circle arrives at consensus 
when none of its members still hold a reason-
able objection to the proposed solution.160 The 
requirements of consensus do not mean that a 
circle cannot move forward until one side sways 
the other to abandon their argument; a circle 
may choose an action that allows the group to 
get more information about the problem, seek 
outside guidance, or ask a higher-up circle to 
weigh in.
Key Elements of the Dynamic Governance Model for Any Open Source 
Initiative
Decision-making power is highly dispersed throughout the community
In a dynamic governance model, every contributor will have a voice in how the project functions, even if some ideas 
come from the top down, which can create a strong sense of belonging and empowerment for all. This model does, 
however, require contributors to commit to being involved consistently, while other governance structures allow the 
average contributor to flit in and out, handling discrete tasks but staying unengaged with the organization itself. 
Certain contributors will find this level of commitment more appealing than others.
Need for consistency may limit community growth potential
Because every contributor would be part of a project circle in an open source project with a dynamic governance 
structure, it may be challenging to add new contributors as soon as they show up, or to add a lot very quickly. For 
projects that expect to expand rapidly, dynamic governance may not be a sustainable model, as it lends itself more 
to a cathedral than a bazaar. Small- to mid-sized projects that want to collaborate closely with all contributors will 
find dynamic governance a better fit.
Understanding and acceptance of deliberative processes and governance structure 
at all levels is essential
One risk of a decentralized model is that, lacking a strong central authority, smaller decisions get drawn out and 
institutional hang-ups will derail work toward the organization’s goals. To avoid this pitfall, open source leaders must 
do their best to educate the community about how the dynamic governance model should work within the organiza-
tion and to establish very clear procedures for how the circle model should run. It may also be helpful to identify the 
ideal size of each circle and develop a process for funneling new contributors to the areas of greatest need.
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All About Boards: Examples from the 
Nonprofit World
Introduction
A traditional, formal nonprofit is legally obligat-
ed to have a board of directors charged with en-
suring “prudent use of all assets,” adherence to 
applicable laws and ethical mandates, and col-
lective decision-making “in the best interest of 
the nonprofit corporation.”161 But these boards 
often take on a role in organizational gover-
nance beyond their legal obligations, and many 
unincorporated or all-volunteer organizations 
rely on the board structure for leadership and 
volunteer management. Open source organiza-
tions could use lessons from the nonprofit world 
to leverage the board of directors model, even if 
they are not a nonprofit, as a stand-alone gov-
ernance model, as a feature of any of the tradi-
tional open-source governance models we have 
already discussed, or as a separate “big-pic-
ture” evaluative body. Additionally, recommen-
dations about board selection and membership 
are also applicable to an open-source project 
looking to fill leadership roles.
The essential purpose of a board in a nonprof-
it or mission-oriented organization is to advise 
and steer the direction and long-term vision of 
group. As an entity, the board can accomplish 
this in a number of ways. In volunteer-run orga-
nizations, the board will act as the staff, creat-
ing and maintaining organizational documents, 
galvanizing and assigning volunteers to specif-
ic tasks, procuring funding, and other tasks as 
needed.162 In a publication on all-volunteer or-
ganization boards, the National Center for Non-
profit Boards and the Support Center for Non-
profit Management also highlight the board’s 
role in recruiting new volunteer leaders and 
collectively working to evolve the organization, 
bringing in outside help if necessary.163 The most 
effective all-volunteer boards members also reg-
ularly confer with the community they repre-
sent, making sure that the board as a whole un-
derstands community needs and concerns, and 
also that the community feels heard by those at 
the helm.164 To tackle specific aspects of their or-
ganization’s work, board members may oversee 
committees tasked with different aspects of the 
organization’s work, similar to the sub-council 
system in a delegated governance. A board of 
directors typically includes roles such as a pres-
ident and vice president who oversee the entire 
organization, a secretary who records the de-
liberations of the group, a treasurer who tracks 
the organization’s finances, and other posts 
and committees specific to the organization’s 
needs.165
Choosing a Board
Nonprofits use a variety of methods to choose 
board composition. Many nonprofits organize 
a nominating committee made up of existing 
board members to identify community mem-
bers or others who match the board’s needs. 
These committees may also evaluate the current 
board’s efficacy and make suggestions to im-
prove performance.166 In this model, board mem-
bers do not always come from within the orga-
nization. If the nominating committee identifies 
a particular institutional need that the current 
community cannot fill, they will recruit outsiders 
who have the requisite skills and find the organi-
zation’s mission compelling.
Other organizations opt for a more democrat-
ic model, electing board leadership through 
a member vote.167 Some experts in nonprofit 
management worry that an elected board can 
become a soapbox for individuals rather than 
a platform for the organization – an organiza-
tion’s paid leadership may struggle to connect 
with board members or motivate them to serve 
the organization rather than themselves.168 But, 
for all-volunteer organizations (like many open 
source projects), an election may help keep 
members engaged and give recognition to those 
who are particularly committed. 
Notably, organizations need not wed themselves 
to a particular selection model – some seats on 
a board might come from a nominating process, 
while others could be reserved for elected com-
munity representatives. One suggestion from 
McKinsey & Company nonprofit consultants is 
to establish a two-tiered board.169 In this format, 
one tier meets regularly and consists of mem-
bers who are directly involved with the project, 
and the other meets annually or semi-annually 
in an advisory capacity, with members who are 
experienced but not part of the day-to-day op-
erations of the project. 170
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The suggestions above help illustrate how a 
board structure can be a helpful format for or 
supplement to the technical governance of a 
open-source organization, nonprofit or other-
wise. In a small organization, a board can dep-
utize community members and create a clear 
division of responsibilities, which can expand 
into councils or other governing sub-bodies over 
time as the project expands.
A board can also serve as the place where oth-
er important but non-development-related work 
gets done. The recent experience of the io.js 
community demonstrates how such a format 
might work. Io.js originated from the existing 
open-source project node.js (begun by Joyent) 
because many members felt its organization-
al and copyright ownership structures posed 
serious problems.171 While the new technical 
governance model spurred higher contributor 
engagement and a better product, project lead-
ers realized they were neglecting non-technical 
concerns that might once again cause problems 
for the project itself if ignored, such as financial 
planning, legal advising and public relations.172 
As a result, io.js leaders worked with entities at 
Joyent and the Linux Foundation to create their 
own foundation and board to supplement their 
delegated governance technical structure.173 
This format enabled the io.js community to man-
age technical and organizational well-being 
needs separately and concurrently. Though io.js 
chose to go the nonprofit route, other corporate 
forms could also use a similar vision of a distinct 
but connected process board and development 
team to advance their organization.
Federated Nonprofits (“Model E”)
One governance model that open-source orga-
nizations may want to consider from the non-
profit world is the federated nonprofit (separate-
ly described as “Model E” in the accompanying 
illustrations). The federated nonprofit organiza-
tional structure is employed by groups like Girl 
Scouts of America, the American Red Cross, 
and other national nonprofits with semi-auton-
omous regional chapters.174 These chapters run 
programs, fundraise, and self-govern for their 
particular region, often relying heavily on the 
contributions of volunteers but also coordinate 
with and take direction from a national govern-
ing body.175 
Generally, regional chapters take direction 
from the national organization on policies and 
the services they provide to the community, but 
make day-to-day decisions on their own and 
occasionally develop programs specific to their 
needs. Regional chapters or affiliates have their 
own leadership teams to run daily operations, 
supported by the organization’s members. To 
connect the regional and national, many fed-
erated nonprofits periodically host national 
gatherings for members.176 National boards of 
directors may be appointed without input from 
lower-levels, but in some federated nonprofits, 
members elect the board.177 In the most partici-
patory federated nonprofits, members will also 
vote on certain policy decisions or amendments 
to the organization’s bylaws.178
Most small- to medium-sized open-source proj-
ects would find the federated model too siloed 
for their organization’s needs. To some, semi-in-
dependent project chapters might sound like a 
great way to induce software to fork into dis-
crete projects, something that early-stage orga-
nizations generally want to avoid. However, for 
a larger, better-established open-source orga-
nization that works on multiple projects, or for 
those that create different software versions for 
specific applications, a federated model would 
allow these teams to operate independently 
in their spheres while remaining connected to 
the top-level leadership through the election of 
board members. 
An open source organization could also choose 
to give contributors voting rights on certain as-
pects of project direction at the global level. 
Whereas in the dynamic governance model, sub-
councils are responsible for different aspects of 
how the project functions, including communi-
ty and process, a federated model would have 
each project team be more autonomously re-
sponsible for its own community, process, and 
technical teams. Project chapters could employ 
a meritocratic, delegated governance, or other 
governance model within themselves while re-
maining linked to the umbrella organization.
Norms and Attitudes for a Successful 
Open Source Software Organization
Regardless of the governance model an orga-
nization adopts, community norms and leader-
ship qualities can play a major part in shaping 
21GOVERNANCE MODELS FROM THE OPEN SOURCE WORLD & BEYOND
how the organization operates. Establishing 
models for leadership and community behavior, 
either explicitly or through leading by example, 
can lay the groundwork for strong, productive, 
and amicable relationships both between lead-
ership members and within the organization as 
a whole.
One major challenge for all organizations – but 
particularly those focused on specific skillsets 
(like institutions engaged in open-source soft-
ware development) – is recognizing the val-
ue of outside perspectives and non-technical 
skills. Because the heart of every open source 
project is the development and maintenance of 
the project’s code, it’s not always apparent how 
non-technical contributions should be recog-
nized, or how they might improve development 
processes or community relations. 
In the same vein, those who are the best develop-
ers and code contributors may not always pos-
sess the soft skills required for open-source lead-
ership roles. Many of the most successful open 
source companies are ones that recognized this 
possibility early on and constructed their com-
munity intentionally to welcome non-technical 
contributions and identify community members 
with leadership potential, whether or not they 
were the strongest developers. 
Apache, as the case study illustrates, is one ex-
ample where an organization learned to iden-
tify non-technical needs and how to fill them. 
Sometimes Apache taps particular contributors 
who show a capacity for long-term planning 
and leadership to step into non-technical roles, 
while at other times members are recruited and 
selected solely for having non-technical skills. 
Consciously selecting for specific non-technical 
skills and qualities has allowed Apache to create 
a diversity of backgrounds within the communi-
ty, which in turn made the organization nimbler 
and more capable.
Ubuntu’s community manager Jono Bacon ex-
amined the qualities that make Ubuntu’s Com-
munity Council work in his book The Art of Com-
munity. He identifies several traits he thinks all 
open-source leadership teams should possess.179 
According to Bacon, a good community leader 
should be, in some combination:
• a good listener, who can make community 
members feel heard and can use this skill to 
get a read on the community and resolve is-
sues;
• detail-oriented;
• able to recognize his or her biases and strive 
to set them aside in order to understand all 
sides;
• “a fair fighter” who will champion ideas they 
feel are best for the community while also 
being willing to concede or compromise for 
the greater good; and
• reliable, to show up when asked and partici-
pate wholeheartedly.180
Nonprofits and mission-driven organizations 
also encounter many of the same issues that 
open-source organizations face, regardless 
of mission, including organizing a leadership 
structure to govern their peers and/or a commu-
nity they wish to help. Many of these groups are 
governed by a Chief Executive Officer and vol-
unteer board, but the model of cultivating lead-
ership that they provide could translate well to 
other governance models. 
One suggestion from the nonprofit consulting 
world is creating opportunities for training in 
leadership skills for current organizational lead-
ership, or those who wish to join it.181 Depending 
on the leadership model, term limits can also 
help to keep the governing body dynamic and 
motivated. So can establishing “formal targets” 
for the leadership’s make-up, such as mandat-
ing equal gender distribution or a minimum per-
centage of members in a particular age range 
or from diverse backgrounds.182
Finally, a clear understanding of the project’s 
mission and goals is equally as important in 
cultivating group leadership and a governance 
structure as it is in determining a formal cor-
porate governance structure. Having a specif-
ic vision helps define expectations of those in 
leadership roles, both in terms of what a lead-
er needs to accomplish and what qualities she 
should develop. Leaders who understand the 
mission of an organization are able “to connect 
[their] actions to the ultimate purpose of the or-
ganization,” thereby making them more invest-
ed and dedicated in furthering the mission and, 
in turn, motivating the community.183
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CONCLUSION
When open source creators launch new proj-
ects, their primary concerns may be technical. 
But expanding their focus to the organizational 
can have enormous benefits. Projects that make 
thoughtful decisions around corporate forma-
tion may streamline dealings with the IRS and 
also create stable entities that will help them 
be sustainable and dedicated to their ultimate 
missions. Projects that spend time considering 
questions about corporate formation set them-
selves up to: create a welcoming project com-
munity with engaged and invested contributors; 
and then govern that community effectively.
The formation and governance options in this 
report may not fit every project’s needs and 
goals. Open source initiatives have a wide array 
of interests; while they rely on similar tools, they 
create many different products and rely on dif-
ferent processes in their development activities. 
The authors encourage open source project cre-
ators and contributors to take what resonates 
from this guide – whether a whole model or a 
few practices – and use those lessons to shape 
their organizations as they see fit.
Though it is sometimes overlooked, the history 
of the open source movement shows us that the 
projects that defined their corporate structure 
and governance practices early and concretely 
set themselves up for success. While some ele-
ments of the landscape have changed – most 
notably the IRS’s attitude toward open source 
projects – the benefits of intentionality remain. 
By setting the tone early on through decisions 
on formation and governance, project founders 
can harness the unique power of open source 
communities to create sustainable open source 
projects from which we can all benefit.
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Case Study #1:  
Apache Software Foundation
The Apache Software Foundation (“Apache”) was founded in 19991 to provide an organizational framework and 
support services for a variety of open source software projects.2 Apache’s most well-known project is the HTTP 
Server Project, which provides the world’s most widely used server software.3 The vast majority of Apache’s 
revenue comes from donations.4 Apache’s donations web page notes that “donations to [Apache] should be 
tax-deductible.”5
Apache applied for 501(c)(3) status in or around mid-2000.6 After responding to an IRS request for additional 
information,7 Apache was granted 501(c)(3) status in February 2001.8
In Apache’s application for 501(c)(3) status, the organization described its activities in general terms and pro-
vided some arguments for linking its work to one of the exempt purposes listed in 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3). In the 
narrative description of the organization’s activities, Apache emphasized its goals of “supplying hardware, 
communications, and business infrastructure” for open source software projects; “creat[ing] an independent 
legal entity to which individuals can donate resources”; and “provid[ing] a means for individual volunteers to 
be sheltered from legal suits.”9 According to the application, Apache’s activities constituted a scientific purpose 
because “the organization is using its research for the public benefit through the open source software it de-
velops and sponsors.”10 
Apache did not argue that the foundation itself directly produces any public benefits. Instead, Apache por-
trayed itself as an umbrella organization for open source software projects. In stating its exempt purpose, 
however, Apache asserted that its exempt purpose could rest on the basis of the research conducted by proj-
ects supported by Apache. Because the public might benefit from the projects’ software, Apache implies, its 
research is “for the public benefit.” Apache’s response to the IRS’s request for additional information did not 
provide any additional arguments to support the assertion that Apache had an exempt purpose, other than by 
offering greater detail regarding its individual projects.11 The IRS granted 501(c)(3) status to Apache.
The IRS considers research to be “in the public interest” if the organization in question meets any one of a num-
ber of requirements. One way of satisfying these requirements is for the organization to make the results of its 
research “available to the public on a nondiscriminatory basis.”12 In its application, Apache explained that its 
software was copyrighted in a way that granted “the general public the maximum flexibility and access to the 
software and to allow its reuse to as large an extent as possible.”13 Compared with open source projects that 
have applied more recently, this “public interest” argument is more loosely constructed.
Apache’s application process illustrates a trend at the IRS toward more restrictive standards for granting 501(c)
(3) status. Apache received 501(c)(3) status less than a year after submitting its original application. The or-
ganization managed to survive multiple rounds of review without providing the level of detail or all the kinds 
of information required by current IRS guidance. The differences in the Apache application process and the 
specificity required for 501(c)3 status points to a shift in policy and a new understanding of open source orga-
nizations at the IRS that has resulted in higher thresholds for success.
1 See The Apache Software Foundation, Form 1023: Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue 
Code (2000), available at http://www.apache.org/foundation/records/ASF-1023.pdf; I.R.S. Final Determination Ltr. (Feb. 21, 2001), available at http://
www.apache.org/foundation/records/ASF-501c3.pdf.
2 The Apache Software Foundation, supra note 1.
3 November 2014 Web Server Survey, Netcraft, http://news.netcraft.com/archives/category/web-server-survey/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2014).
4 See The Apache Software Foundation, Form 990: Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax 1 (Dec. 15, 2013), available at http://
www.apache.org/foundation/records/990-2012.pdf.
5 Donating to the Apache Software Foundation, The Apache Software Foundation, http://www.apache.org/foundation/contributing.html 
(last visited Dec. 5, 2014).
6 See The Apache Software Foundation, supra note 1. 
7 See The Apache Software Foundation, Amendments to Form 1023, available at http://www.apache.org/foundation/records/ASF-1023-
Amendments.pdf.
8 See I.R.S. Final Determination Ltr., supra note 1.
9 The Apache Software Foundation, Form 1023, supra note 7.
10 Id.
11 See The Apache Software Foundation, supra note 1.
12 Id.
13 The Apache Software Foundation, supra note 1, at 8.
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Case Study #2:
X.Org14
Launched in 1997, the X.Org project develops “an open source implementation of the X Window System,”15 which 
provides the foundation for graphical user interfaces.16 In addition to its development activities, the X.Org Foun-
dation (“X.Org”) also hosts conferences and internship programs for students.17 Through its “Endless Vacation 
of Code” program, students submit project proposals, and those selected get to work full-time over a three- to 
four-month periods with a stipend of $5,000 to $6,000 and support from a lead member of the organization’s 
technical community.18 X.Org also offers the same opportunity without funding for non-students. Prior to re-
ceiving nonprofit status, the organization had received “significant funding” from Intel, Google, and Oracle.19 
The organization now solicits donations from the general public.20 X.Org does not have any paid employees.21
X.Org submitted its application for 501(c)(3) status in April 2011.22 The IRS granted X.Org 501(c)(3) status in May 
2012.
In its application, X.Org argued that it was organized exclusively for scientific, educational, and charitable 
purposes but placed greater emphasis on the latter two purposes. The application did not advance a particu-
larly notable case that X.Org had a scientific purpose. The application stated that the X Window System proj-
ect “focuses on stability and open standards,” which could have led to a discussion of how X.Org’s research 
benefits the public.23 However, X.Org did not frame most of its activities as research in the text, using the word 
“research” only twice.24 Nor did the application make a strong case for satisfying one of the scientific purpose 
requirements. For example, X.Org did not directly address the IRS standard of research “available to the public 
on a nondiscriminatory basis,” focusing instead on its open source licenses.25
X.Org made a much stronger argument for having an educational purpose. 557 defines “educational” for the 
purposes of obtaining 501(c)(3) status as meaning either “[t]he instruction or training of individuals for the 
purpose of improving or developing their capabilities” or “[t]he instruction of the public on subjects useful to in-
dividuals and beneficial to the community.”26 The list of organizations that may qualify as educational includes 
“[a]n organization whose activities consist of conducting public discussion groups, forums, panels, lectures, or 
other similar programs.”27
In its application, X.Org presented its activities in order to match these requirements. For example, X.Org stated 
that it was founded in order to “ensure that the public has access to educational and scientific literature that 
furthers their use of the X Window System,”28 thus demonstrating how X.Org’s work creates valuable opportuni-
ties for the public to further their understanding of the system. The application also stated that X.Org publishes 
“human-readable source code, documentation, and materials,”29 which X.Org argued helps users “improve 
their ability to design and implement software.”30 
14 Note that the IRS revoked X.Org’s 501(c)(3) status in 2013 because the organization failed to file its tax returns. See Michael Larabel, X.Org 
Foundation Loses Its 501(c)(3) Status, Phoronix (Aug. 23, 2013, 1:22 PM) http://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=MTQ0MzU.
15  X.Org Foundation, http://www.x.org/wiki/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2014).
16  The X Window SystemTM, X.Org Foundation, http://www.opengroup.org/desktop/x/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2014).
17  501(c)(3) Status Determination, X.Org Foundation, http://www.x.org/wiki/Other/Press/501c3StatusDetermination/ (last visited Dec. 5, 
2014).
18  The X.Org Endless Vacation of Code (EVoC), X.Org Foundation, http://www.x.org/wiki/XorgEVoC/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2014).
19  X.Org Foundation, supra note 203.
20  Id.
21  X.Org Foundation, supra note 201. 
22  Justin C. Colannino, Re: Form 1023 Application for Recognition of Exemption of X.ORG FOUNDATION (Apr. 29, 2011), available at http://ww-
w.x.org/foundation/irs-form-1023/1-Cover.pdf.
23  X.Org Foundation, Addendum to Form 1023 2 (Apr. 22, 2011), available at http://www.x.org/foundation/irs-form-1023/4-ExhibitC.pdf.
24  Id.
25  Id.
26  See Internal Revenue Service, Be on the Look Out List (Aug. 2010); Be on the Look Out List (Nov. 2010); Be on the Look Out List (Feb. 2011); Be 
on the Look Out List (Feb. 2012); Be on the Look Out List (Jul. 2012) available at http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/press-release/new-irs-infor-
mation-shows-“progressives”-included-bolo-screening-list.
27  Id. at 26.
28  X.Org Foundation, supra note 15, at 2.
29  Id.
30  Id.
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X.Org additionally asserted that the release and use of source code fit the second definition of “educational” 
by calling software development “an activity beneficial to the community.”31 In order to buttress this argument, 
X.Org cited case law in which the Second Circuit observed that a programmer reading code “might use this in-
formation to improve personal programming skills.”32 X.Org also highlighted the specific educational activities 
it sponsors, including the Endless Vacation of Code, conferences, and “active mailing list and wiki” as exam-
ples.33 This description allowed X.Org to fit the model of an educational organization “whose activities consist 
of conducting public discussion groups, forums, panels, lectures, or other similar programs.” 
X.Org also established that it has a charitable purpose as a second justification for 501(c)(3) status. According 
to 557, a charitable organization must show that it is intended to benefit the public interest34 by advancing 
education, assisting the poor, or erecting public works.35 A charitable organization may show that it advances 
education by offering scholarships.36 
To that end, X.Org discussed the Endless Vacation of Code program in detail. The application emphasized that 
students enrolled in the Endless Vacation of Code receive “a monetary reward” upon completion of program 
goals.37 X.Org also argued that it assisted the poor by providing its software to the public for free. This benefit 
is amplified because X.Org code is built into other popular software, driving down development costs, which 
gives everyone, including the poor, greater access to good software.38 
Finally, X.Org argued that its software development constitutes the erection of a public work. X.Org defined 
public works as facilities or processes that are “beneficial to the general public” by generalizing from examples 
like public swimming pools, playgrounds, or public transportation. Whereas traditional examples of public 
works are created to benefit a specific community,39 X.Org’s software allows anyone who wants to download its 
software or incorporates its code to benefit, removing the hampers of “occupancy limitations” or “convenience 
of physical location.”40 This argument attempts to expand “public works” to accommodate digital products and 
services offered to the public and unrestricted by license requirements. 
X.Org’s application provides multiple arguments for federal tax exemption that differed from Apache’s approach 
(addressed in the accompanying Case Study #1). In Apache’s application, the organization described its soft-
ware development activities, briefly asserted that its activities constituted scientific research that benefited 
the public, and claimed that the organization was founded for an exempt scientific purpose. In contrast, X.Org 
emphasized its non-development activities, including an internship and scholarship program, and described 
how open-source software development can fit the concept of public works. 
The IRS had already begun to subject open-source software organizations to closer review when X.Org submit-
ted its application.41 Therefore, X.Org’s efforts to cast itself as an educational and charitable organization may 
have been in response to these heightened standards. Regardless of X.Org’s motivations for advancing these 
arguments, their application demonstrates that open source organizations often have means other than “sci-
entific purposes” to advocate for tax-exempt status. 
31  Id.
32  Id. (citing Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley 273 F.3d 429, 448 (2d Cir. 2001)).
33  Id. at 2–3.
34  Internal Revenue Service, supra note 26, at 28.
35  Id.
36  Id.
37  X.Org Foundation, supra note 15, at 3.
38  Id.
39  Id.
40  Id.
41  McMillan, supra note 9 (discussing OSET’s submission of its application for 501(c)(3) status in 2007).
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Case Study #3:
Yorba Foundation
The Yorba Foundation (“Yorba”) is a nonprofit organization that develops Linux desktop software.42 Its projects 
include Shotwell, a photo manager;43 Geary, an IMAP email client;44 and California, a calendar application.45 
Yorba’s projects are hosted by GNOME, but Yorba and the GNOME Foundation are legally and financially in-
dependent of one another.46 Yorba applied for 501(c)(3) status in 2009 and received a final determination letter 
rejecting the application in 2014.47
In its application, Yorba advanced many of the same arguments used by X.Org (described in the accompanying 
Case Study #2). Yorba claimed that it was organized for charitable and scientific purposes.48 Like X.Org, Yorba 
attempted to show that it advanced education, assisted the poor, and erected a public work. Yorba claimed to 
advance education by making available to the public its source code as well as a wiki and user guide.49 
Yorba’s assertion that “[f]ree and open source software fundamentally has an educational component”50 was 
reminiscent of arguments made by X.Org,51 but unlike X.Org, Yorba did not offer any conferences, internships, 
or scholarship programs. In explaining how its software assists the poor, Yorba noted that its products provide 
free alternatives “to software that can sell for as much as $1,000 a license.”52 In contrast, X.Org suggested that 
its software helped to drive down development costs, without a specific price comparison.53 Yorba similarly 
framed free open-source software as a public work because the software, “through free and open source li-
censing, [is] dedicated to the public.”54 This argument differs slightly from X.Org’s argument, which focused 
on the public actually deriving benefits from X.Org’s software. Yorba does not advance a detailed argument 
in support of its scientific purpose claim, stating simply that “free and open source software project creates a 
public domain of technical knowledge that anyone can learn and use.”55 
Yorba application for 501(c)(3) status was rejected, and the IRS justified its decision by defining key terms and 
concepts narrowly, possibly a result of a shift in policy toward open-source organizations. For example, while 
Yorba and X.Org both claimed to serve the public as a charitable class, in the Yorba determination letter the 
IRS decided that the public does not qualify because not “all members of public [sic] share any charitable 
characteristics.”56 The IRS also refused to accept that source code has educational value. The IRS explained 
that educational activities must involve “instruction” or “training,” while Yorba provided its source code “with-
out any additional activity.”57 The IRS contended that the purpose of providing source code to users is to allow 
them to modify the code and that any learning in that process is “incidental,”58 undercutting the educational 
value of source code articulated by both organizations. 
The IRS also rejected the proposition that no-cost, non-proprietary software constitutes a public work. The IRS 
referred to historical sources to define “public works” as including only physical facilities “ordinarily provided 
at public expense.”59 Based on these sources, the IRS decided that “intangibles” like software do not constitute 
42  Kendra Albert, Open Source Madness, Electronic Frontier Foundation (Jul. 16, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/07/open-
source-madness.
43  Shotwell, GNOME Wiki, https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/Shotwell (last visited Dec. 5, 2014).
44  Geary, GNOME Wiki, https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/Geary (last visited Dec. 5, 2014).
45  California, GNOME Wiki, https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/California (last visited Dec. 5, 2014).
46  Jim Nelson, Yorba and GNOME, Yorba Blog Archives (Dec. 23, 2013), http://blogs.gnome.org/jnelson/2013/12/23/yorba-and-gnome/.
47  Nelson, supra note 2.
48  I.R.S. Final Determination Ltr. 1 (May 22, 2014), available at http://yorba.org/docs/IRS-determination-letter-final.pdf.
49  Id. at 2.
50  Id. at 2.
51  X.Org Foundation, supra note 15, at 2.
52  I.R.S. Final Determination Ltr., supra note 48, at 2.
53  X.Org Foundation, supra note 15, at 3.
54  I.R.S. Final Determination Ltr., supra note 48, at 8.
55  Id. at 3.
56  Id.
57  Id. at 9–10.
58  Id. at 10.
59  I.R.S. Final Determination Ltr., supra note 234, at 8 (citing Comment (k) Restatement 3d Trusts; The Statute of Charitable Uses, 43 Eliz. I, c.4 
(1601) (describing as charitable the construction of “bridges, ports, havens, causeways . . . and highways”); Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th ed. (defining 
“public works” as “[s]tructures, such as roads or dams built by the government for public use and paid for by public funds”)).
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public works.60 Even if intangibles could qualify as public works, the IRS argued they would not qualify because 
open-source software is not “ordinarily provided at public expense” by governmental agencies.61 This narrow 
formulation of “public works” differs significantly from the definitions put forth by Yorba and X.Org that hinge 
on whether the resource is intended to benefit or actually benefits the public. 
Finally, the IRS rejected the argument that open-source software development constitutes scientific research, 
for which neither organization advanced strong arguments. The IRS classified Yorba’s software development as 
“routine product development,” rather than “testing to validate scientific hypotheses.”62 Based on this classi-
fication, the IRS found Yorba’s activities to be more commercial than scientific. By narrowing terms and refor-
mulating concepts, the IRS raised the threshold an open-source software organization would need to meet in 
order to obtain 501(c)(3) status. 
Yorba’s determination letter need not doom nonprofit open-source software development. IRS determination 
letters have no precedential value.63 As a result, the conclusions reached in the Yorba determination letter are 
not binding on subsequent determination letters, though they may provide insight into how the IRS thinks about 
certain issues at a given point in time. The IRS may reach different or even opposite conclusions in the future. 
Second, the differences between Yorba’s and X.Org’s activities may point to the sorts of activities the IRS will 
look for in deciding whether to grant 501(c)(3) status to open-source software organizations. X.Org offered con-
ferences and a scholarship/internship program to students in order to train and instruct software developers 
in their use of X.Org’s software. Yorba did not offer any comparable educational activities. Learning from the 
experience of Yorba, an open-source software organization considering 501(c)(3) status may want to consider 
whether and how they are furthering software development education and emphasize such actions in their 
application
60  Id.
61  Id. at 9.
62  Id. at 10.
63  26 U.S.C. 6110(k)(3) (2012).
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CASE STUDY #4:
BRAVE NEW SOFTWARE
Brave New Software (“BNS”), an open-source software organization “dedicated to keeping the Internet open 
and decentralized” through the creation of tools to combat censorship and other limitations to internet access, 
submitted a 501(c)3 status application in August of 2010.64 A letter from the State Department advocating for 
an expedited process accompanied their application. As is the case with many OSS organizations, the IRS took 
nearly two years to make an initial determination on BNS’s case, issuing a rejection in May 2012. The IRS re-
sponded to each of the 501(c)3 purposes BNS argued it qualified for: charitable (and within that, “lessening the 
burdens of the US government,” promoting human and civil rights, “promoting relief of the poor and distressed 
or underprivileged,” and “erection or maintenance of public works”), educational, and scientific.65
The IRS contended that several pronouncements by the State Department about their desire to fight internet 
censorship did not suffice to prove that the work of BNS was related to a burden of the US government. The 
IRS felt that a State Department grant to BNS also did not indicate that the department needed BNS’s help to 
combat censorship, but more closely resembled a “payment for a service” than burden sharing.66 Next, the IRS 
argued that First Amendment and UN international protections of free speech and freedom of expression could 
not be expanded to include a human right to internet access, and therefore, BNS could not qualify as promoting 
human and civil rights through their work. 
Regarding the claim of “promoting relief of the poor,” the IRS determined that because BNS did not limit who 
could use their censorship circumvention software, their actions did not sufficiently impact a distressed or 
marginalized group to meet this standard.67 Confusingly, their rejection of BNS’s claim as a creator of a public 
work stated that BNS’s software to combat censorship was too targeted to qualify as a public work (since only 
those dealing with censorship could benefit from it), and, moreover, that software did not meet the traditional 
definition of a public work (similar to the determination in Yorba’s application).68
Turning to the educational purpose, the IRS found that BNS did not educate the public through its publication 
of code or materials to help understand how to use its software because those were activities that a commercial 
group might perform to promote its products.69 
Additionally, the IRS determined that BNS did not promote education through the creation of its software be-
cause the censorship circumvention software could be used to access anything online, including potentially 
illegal or dangerous materials that the IRS believed countries had the right to restrict. Finally, the IRS concluded 
that BNS did not meet the scientific purpose definition because its activities most closely resembled commer-
cial product research development, not scientific research, and BNS is not a publisher or advocate of scientific 
scholarly literature.70
BNS and its attorneys responded to the denial in June of 2012 and offered arguments to counter most of the 
IRS’ claims, starting with the IRS determination that the US government did not consider itself responsible 
for promoting internet freedom. BNS pointed to the announcement of the Internet Freedom Program by the 
State Department, where Secretary Clinton used the word burden to describe the US role in combatting online 
censorship, as well as other instances when the government talked about the need to support censorship cir-
cumvention technologies.71 Further, BNS argued that the State Department specifically designed their Internet 
Freedom Program to reflect the fact that the government did not have the means to fulfill their burden in com-
batting internet censorship.
BNS corrected the IRS’s reading of their program’s human rights focus, pointing out that “freedom of expression 
64  “About Us,” Brave New Software (accessed March 15, 2016) http://www.bravenewsoftware.org/; “IRS Ruling Documentation,” Open Source 
Initiative (accessed March 15, 2016) https://wiki.opensource.org/bin/Main/Projects/entities-wg/IRS+Ruling+Documentation/
65  Lerner, Lois G., “Letter of Denial,” Internal Revenue Service (May 16, 2012), https://wiki.opensource.org/bin/Main/Projects/entities-wg/
IRS+Ruling+Documentation/#HBraveNewSoftwareProject2CInc.
66  Id., at 13.
67  Id.
68  Id.
69  Id.
70  Id.
71  Williamson, Aaron & Adam Fisk, Brave New Software Project Letter of Protest, June 28, 2012
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online depends on uncensored access,” and that their goal was not to tout internet access as a human right.72 
In response to the IRS’s assertion that any group that aids the distressed or underprivileged must make sure 
their resources were primarily available to the groups in question, BNS used unrestricted internet access at 
libraries, a traditional class of non-profit, as a counter-example. BNS referenced several well-known occasions 
when library users or libraries themselves have promoted or engaged in illegal activities, such as endorsing 
WikiLeaks or allowing the Unabomber to plan his attacks on a public computer.73 According to BNS, this type of 
policy is permitted, even if the results are illegal activity, because neither US nor international law uses prior 
restraint as a policy with regards to online speech, given that such policies often preemptively limit free speech. 
References to the United States State Department used by the IRS to indicate support for prior restraint were 
actually discussing the right of states to punish illegal activity after the fact.74 
Nonetheless, BNS imagined these improper uses would be incidental when measured against uses as intended. 
BNS again returned to the example of libraries when refuting the IRS’s rejection of its activities as educational, 
reminding the agency that if educational organizations could only provide access to “educational” materi-
als, most libraries would be ineligible.75 BNS also highlighted the many programs they offered to educate the 
public on combatting censorship. Finally, the organization indicated the IRS’s determination that its work was 
too broad to qualify as promoting relief of underprivileged groups, but too narrow to qualify as a public work 
seemed problematic.
The IRS did not respond to BNS’s letter of protest until nearly two years later, in June of 2014 when it reversed its 
decision.76 Unfortunately, the notice of approval does not contain any information about what occurred in the 
intervening time or what elements of BNS’s letter proved persuasive.
As the IRS notes, each individual IRS application is considered on its merits, and previous approvals or denials 
are not precedential. In addition, the fact that BNS had substantial support from the US Department of State 
makes this case unique in certain aspects. Nonetheless, there are some lessons we can draw from this exchange 
that can aid fledgling OSS organizations considering non-profit status.
As X.Org and Yorba both confirm, organizations should not try to contend that they fulfill a scientific purpose 
unless their software development contributes directly to scientific research as defined by the IRS – “the orga-
nization must (1) engage in scientific research; (2) the scientific research must not include activities that are 
incident to commercial or industrial operations; and, (3) the scientific research must be undertaken in the pub-
lic’s interest” – or helps disseminate scientific research.77 While OSS organizations may feel tempted to check 
as many boxes as possible in a 501(c)3 application, it may be more effective to concentrate on other exempt 
categories that have a direct tie to the organization’s mission. The use of scientific tools does not make an ac-
tion “scientific” in the eyes of the IRS, and they are unlikely to see anything outside the traditional confines of 
scientific research and debate as appropriate for such a designation. This line of argument was the only one 
that BNS abandoned in their response to the IRS’ initial decision.
Open source software initiatives can also follow BNS’s example in highlighting the parallels between their pur-
pose and services and existing classes of non-profit organizations. In its reply to the IRS, BNS compared the 
example of libraries providing internet access and non-educational content to visitors to their own program to 
demonstrate that similar First Amendment reasoning against prior restraint apply in both.78 This parallel helped 
illustrate that the IRS’s claim that an educational organization should only provide access to educational ma-
terials was inconsistent with its view of a large class of charitable organizations. 
While BNS made this point in fighting back against an initial IRS decision, other organizations could make par-
allels preemptively to groups that traditionally get IRS approval. Doing so may make the functions of an OSS’s 
services more comprehensible for the IRS staff. Providing analog examples can help move the conversation 
from the realm of technological capabilities into a discussion of the aims of the organization.
Finally, while few OSS organizations (or non-profits in general) enter the 501(c)3 process with endorsements 
72  Id., at 4.
73  Id.
74  Id.
75  Id.
76  Id., Open Source Initiative.
77  Id., Lerner, at 18.
78  Id., Williamson & Fisk.
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and a mandate from the federal government, other groups could emulate the tactics BNS used to convey the 
connection between their mission and an evidenced need in the world. Organizations that are able to cite a 
specific problem in human rights work, education, or other exempt class and demonstrate how the use of open-
source technology can directly remedy that problem stand a better chance of approval than those who focus 
their discussion on the merits of OSS alone. OSS organizations without a clear connection to real-world prob-
lems or human rights implications may find getting 501(c)3 status challenging, given the IRS’s skepticism and 
limited understanding of software development and its potential applications. 
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MODEL A:
BENEVOLENT DICTATORSHIP
Benevolent Dictator
Leads the technical direction of the project 
and organizes the community; final say on 
project decisions and community disputes
Committers
Can make direct changes to the code 
(approved in oﬃcial release deliberations); 
evaluate committers’ code
Contributors
Developers who contribute to a project in 
any meaningful way.
KEY
Represents pattern of escalation
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MODEL B: 
MERITOCRACY
Project Management Committee
Reviews code contributions, participates in strategic 
planning, approves changes to the governance model 
and manages legal issues within project; selects 
committers; resolves community disputes
Committers
Can make direct 
changes to the code 
(approved in oﬃcial 
release deliberations); 
evaluate committers’ 
code
Contributors
Developers who 
contribute to a project 
in any meaningful 
way.
KEY
Represents collaborative, 
non-hierarchical nature of 
meritocratic structure
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MODEL C:
DELEGATED 
GOVERNANCE
Community Council
Reviews all activities of organization; may 
include founders. Members are elected and 
may have term limits.
Process
Subcouncil
KEY
Represents pattern of escalation
Project
Technical
Subcouncil
Project
Team
Project
Team
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General Circle
Highest governing body, where project 
founders, project circle team leaders, and 
representative contributors from each project 
circle sit
Technical Project 
Circle A
Community
Circle
Technical Project
Circle B
Subcircle A Subcircle B
KEY
Paired arrows represent double linkage 
between circles (one circle leader, one circle 
representative)
MODEL D:
DYNAMIC 
GOVERNANCE
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MODEL E:
FEDERATED NONPROFIT
Board of Directors
Project Team 1 Project Team 1 Project Team 1 Project Team 1
Contributors Contributors Contributors Contributors
KEY
Represents escalation from chapter members 
(contributors) to chapter leadership
Represents collaboration between chapters 
and executive board of directors
Represents voting and referendum power of 
contributors at the executive level
